RECENT CASES.
BANKS A.D BA.NKxvvG-LIABD1LTY

FOR PAYMENT TO ONE OTHm .THAN,.

DzPOSITOR-NEGLIGECFL-X was a depositor iii a savings bank. Y stole his
deposit book, went to the bank and, representing himself as X, asked for the
amount of the deposit. The bank was not certain as to Y's identity, though
he satisfied most of the tests, so by way of precaution, it gave him a check
on the teller of the N bank,. who indorsed it to X and handed it to Y. Being
identified as X, he succeeded in getting the plaintiff to cash the check. Plaintiff
deposited it with the 0 bank, which obtained payment from the N bank; but,
upon the forgery being discovered, the N bank recovered the money from
the 0 bank, and the latter from plaintiff, who thereupon brought 'this action
of tort for negligence against the savings bank. Judgment was given for
the defendant, Gallo v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 9z N. E.633 (N. Y. igto).
This case presents a novel situation, n6t only in its facts but also in the
action by which the plaintiff sought- to recover. However, there seems to be
no inherent objection to suing in tort under such circumstances; and while
the conclusion reached by the*Court of Appeals is probably correct, it is submitted that considerable might be said for the view taken by the appellate
division, whose judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed.
BILLS AND NOTES--NEGOTABLE

INSTRUItENTs, LAw-LIABILITY

INCOMPLETED INSTRUMENT, STOLEN BEFORE DF.LivE.-The

Uro.V

AN

decision in Linick

v. A. J. Nutting Co., 125 N. Y. Supp. 93 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. i91o), involves Secs.
x5 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, Secs. 34 and 35 of the N. Y.
Act. A stole a blank check signed by the plaintiff. 'filled it out to a third per.:
son as payee and had it certified at the plaintiff's bank. 'The defendant became
a bona fide holder for value, the payee's endorsement being forged, and collected from the bank. The plaintiff sued defendant for money had and
received to the amount of the check. Held, by a divided court, that the signer
is not liable to a bona fide holder for value on a blank check stolen and completed by the thief. Negotiable Instruments Law, Sec. 16 (Sec. 35, N. Y. Act),
providing. "Where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course,
a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him .o as to make them liable
to him is conclusively presumed." must be read in connection with Sec. i5
(Sec. 34. N. Y. Act), declaring that "Where an incomplete instrument has not
been delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated, without authority, be
a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery."
The decision is based on Baxendale v. Bennett, L. R. 3, Q. B. D. 525
(i8;8). and Burson v.Huntington. 21 Mich. 416 (187o). In the English case
the defendant had written his name as acceptor upon stamped paper. It was
taken front his desk, filled up. and transferred to plaintiff as a bona -fide
holder for value. The court held the defendant was not liable. This seems
to be the only reported case of an. incomplete instrument stolen before
delivery. But none of the judges in the Court of Appeals based their decision
on the fact that the instrument was incomplete. The distinction made is
between an instrument stolen before delivery and one stolen after a delivery
by the maker. Cases of the latter class are numerous, and in all the maker
is held liable. Raphael v. Bank of England. 17 C. B. 162 (1855) ; Murray v.
Lardner, 2 Wall. nio (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1864): Seybel v. Bank. 54 N. Y. 288
(1873); Bank v. Chapman. 123 S. W. 641 (Tenn. 19o9). In Burston v. Huntington, su pra, a completed note was stolen by the payee and transferred to
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an innocent holder for value, and delivery by the maker was held necessary
to create liability. Though followed by some states before the -act, Roberts

v. McGrath, 38 Wis. 52 (1875); Salley v. Terrill, 5o Ad. 896 (-1e.,igot), the
weight of authority was against Burson -v. Huntington. slipra. \Worcestee .Co.
Bank v. Darchester Bank, 57 Am. Dec. 12o (Mass. i8s2) ; Clarke v. Johnson,
54 Ill. 296 (187o) ; Kinyon v. Wohlford, 17 -Minn. 239 (1871); Poess v. Bank,
86 N. Y. Supp. 857 (19o4). The specific language of Sec. 16 was intended to
establish the law in favor of holders in due course, and this conclusive presumption exists as well when the note is. taken from a thief as in any other
case. Massachusetts National Bank v. Snow, 72 N. E.. 959 (Mass. gos). In
the case last cited, Knowlton, C. J., speaking for the court, says: "Of course,
-his rule does not apply to an instrument which is incomplete." This dictum
is the only authority on the question raised in the principal case. "
It is submitted that there is no valid reason for different rules where the
instrument is complete or incomplete. On the grounds of -negligence, public
policy, and the well-settled rule that where a loss must fall upon one of two
innocent parties, it should fall upon the one whose act opened the door for
it to enter. Section t5 of the American law does not appear in the English
Bills of Exchange Act.
CARRIERS-DA.LAGES For DiscRIMINATIo% I FUR.ISHING CARsl-In an
action by a coal company against a railroad -o recover damages for alleged
illegal discrimination in furnishing transportation facilities, the measure of
damages was held to be the reasonably fair profit on the probable output of
the mine, less what was actually shipped from the mine. Hillsdale.Coke &
Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 229 Pa. 61 (19io).
"
A dissenting opinion was based on the fact that the coal 'hich had not
been mined, owing to the defendant's failure to supply cars for its shipment,
still remained in the mine, and would, of course, be marketed at a future
time. The measure of damages, it was argued, ought therefore to be the
difference between the profits actually, or likely to be, realized by a future
mining and sale, and what the profits would have -been had the coal been
mined at the time the plaintiffs were prepared to put it on the market.
Jurisdictions differ as to whether the profits of a business are recoverable
as damages. The earlier Pennsylvania decisions held that profits are -speculative and uncertain to an extent which precludes their recovery, unless they
would have been the direct and immediate fruits of a contract between the
parties, and thus have been stipulated for and within the contemplation of
the parties at the time the contract was made. Adams. Express Co. v. Egbert,
36 Pa. 36o (z86o); WVatterson v. Allegheny Valley Railroad Co., 74 Pa. 208
(1873). The better view seems to be, even where profits are considered
speculative in general, that there is this notable exception to the rule: The
loss of profits from the destruction or interruption ot an established business
may be recovered where the plaintiff makes it reasonably certain by competent
proof, the amount of his actual loss. Central Coal Co. v. Hartman, mIxFed.

96 (igo).
Other courts do not hesitate to consider profits an element of recoverable damages. So it has been held that in case of delayed transportation, the
plaintiff may recover the difference between the market price when the goods
are delivered at their destination, and the market price when they should
have been delivered there, together with damages for deterioration in the value
of the goods. Moore on Carriers. 41o. and the authorities there cited. Where
a carrier refuses or fails to carry the goods tendered by a shipper, the measure of damages is. in most jurisdictions, the difference between the value of
the goods at the time they were to have been delivered at the point of destination, and the value of goods of the same quality, at the same time at the
place of shipment, together with interest from that time, less cost of transportation. Moore on Carriers. 417. and cases cited: Hutch. Carr.. Sec. 774;
Sedg. Dam. Sec. 842.
In all these cases it will be noted that the goods proffered for shipment
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.were specified and limited in quantity, and the failure to furnish transpdrtation -affected them only. It is, therefore, proppr that the courts remember, in
assessing damages, that the goods remain in existence, and do not allow the
entire profits accruing from the sale of the goods. In the principal cases, the
commodity was coal, the supply of which was, within the contemplation of
the litigants concerned, unlimited. Such being the case, any cessation of
mining operations was an absolute loss to the income of the present mine
owners, and it is only fair that they be allowed .the full profits of which
they were deprived. The Interstate Commerce Commission has adopted the
rule of the principal case in Glade Co. v. B. & 0. R. R., xo I. C. R. 226 (19o4);
Eaton v. C. H. & D. Ry., ii I. C. R. 619 (19o6).
In weighing the recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. it
must be observed that the plaintiff claimed under 'the Act of June 4, 1883,
P. L. 72, which forbids discrimihation and subjects offenders to treble damages. The act is, on its face. intended to be deterrent, and its damages are
punitive. To adopt the rule advocated in the dissenting opinion would
entirely prevent the act from producing the result which the legislature must
have intended. Not only would the damages be highly speculative, .but they
would be so trivial as to have no restraining influence on defendants whose
inclinations and interests invite a disregard of the provisions of the act.
The decision is locally interesting as showing the abandonment by the
Pennsylvania courts of the position that profits can never, in the absence of a
specific contract in which they are contemplated, be awarded as damages.

CHosE IN ACT1OX-PARTIAL Ass IGxExT OF AN EXISTING DmrE-ExGusn
Jt'DICATLRE ACT OF 1873.-The case of Forster Y. Baker, 2 K. B. 636 (i91o), is
interesting as presenting a point hitherto unsettled in English law: Is the
partial assignment of a chose in action a legally valid transfer? The facts
were that one Bowles recovered a judgment against Baker for 1675. He

assigned by indenture to Forster f56o thereof "absolutely," with due notice to
Baker. In a special case to try the issue whether Fqrster was entitled to
leave to issue execution under the rules of court, order xlii, v. 2.3: Held, that
the partial assignee was not entitled to such leave.

The plaintiff sought to enforce his claim under Sec. 25, Sub-sec. 6, .of
the Judicature Act of 1873: "Any absolute assignment by writing * * *
of any debt or other legal chose in action of which express notice shall have
been given to the debtor * * * shall be effectual in law
*
to pass
and transfer * * * all legal remedies for the same * * * without the
concurrence of the assignor."
Bray, J., in the lower court interpreted the statute strictly, and as it.nade
no mention of partial assignments, refused to allow the action. In affirming
his decision, the Court of Appeals avoided the question of statutory construction altogether, and explained their stand on the ancient principle, that
out of one judgment there shall be but one execution. This decision must be
taken to overrule Tucker v. Howard, I K. B. 91 (igo) (discussed 58 U. of
P. Law Rev.. p. 5O5), the only authority upon the point at issue. In fact,
Bray, J., considered the case as one of no importance, being unsound in principle, and at best, but a nisi pritis case.
By the common law of England a chose in action was not assignable.
II BI. H. Com. Sec. 442, Liveridge v. Broadbent, 4 H. & N. 6o: (1859),
though the beneficial application of the rule has been doubted in some instances. Masters v. Miller, 4 T. R. 32o. at p. 340. In equity, however, from
the earliest times choses in action have been assignable, IV Halsbury's Laws
of Eng. 374, on the theory that the title of the assignee of the debt was
property--an asset capable of being dealt with as any other asset. Fitzroy v.
Cave, 2 K. B. (igo5) 364. The section of the Judicature Act referred to
enables an assignee to sue in his own name in cases where previously he could
have sued in the assignor's name, but only where he could so sue.
Marchant v. Morton Down & Co., 2 K. B. (191o), p. 632. nor has it made,
assignable contracts that were not assignable in equity before. Tolhnrst v.
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Cement Co., A. C. (19o3), at p. 424. Prior to the act the assignee wias,
however, compelled to join the assignor. Cathcart v. Lewis, I Kes., Jr..463
-In a suit in equity the assignee df a debt, even where the assign(1792).
ment was absolute on the face of it. had to -make his assignor, the original
creditor, a party in order to bind him and prevent a suit by him at law, and
also'to allow him to dispute the assignment if. he saw fit." Chitty, L. J., in
Durham Bros. v. Robertson. I Q. B. (1898), at p: 769. It is obvious that the
same reasoning would require a joinder of tho parties in tile
case of a partial
assignment, but it does not appear from the cases that prior to the act the
English courts ever recognized the rights of a partial absignee suing in his
own right. The few English cases since the act have tended to answer the
question negatively. Brice v. Banister. 3 Q. B. D. 569 (1878). was broad
enough to support the proposition that a portion of a debt could not be
assigned, but this case has since been generally dcubted. Durham Bros. V.
Robertson, supra. Jones v. Humphries. I K. B. (i9oa) to. Hughes v. Pump
House Co., 2 K. B. (19o2) 190. The case under discussion, therefore, seems
squarely within the established principles of English law, as well as in accord
with the trend of the meagre authority existing. This'decision also seems
logically correct. Xo mention being made of partial assignments in the act.
it must be inferred that the intent of the legislature was to exclude them.
Moreover, admitted that the great objection to partjal assignments has always
been that it subjected the debtor to more than. one suit-the application of the
act w6uld not avail, for its purpose was to do away with the joinder of
assignee and assignor. Nor can the theory that the assignment is virtually a
power of attorney to sue at law in the assignor's name afford a satisfactory
explanation, for the assignor himself has the right to sue but once. and therefore cannot give any greater power to an -assignee than he himself has.
Viewed from all standpoints, then. it is now the law of England that a partial assignee cannot sue in his own right, even under the Judicature Act.
In this country the opinion seems universal that the partial assignee
acquires no rights enforceable at law. Mandeville v. Welsh, 5 Vheat. 277
(82o),
per Story, J.. and Ry. v. Volkert. 58 Ohio St. 362 (M&j8), but he is
generally allowed to pursue his rights in equity. James v. Newton, 142 Mass.
366 (i886). (Note review of authorities in this case.) Otis v. Adams. 56
N. J. L. 38 (1893). In Appeals of City of Phila.. 86 Pa. 179 (1878). this
doctrine was admitted, but the court refused to extend it where the debtor
was a municipal corporation (appropriation of councils): on tle ground that
the policy of the law is against permitting individuals, by their private contracts, to embarrass the officers of a municipality. Foll6wcd and approved:
Geist's Appeal, 1o4 Pa. 351 (1883). The reason for allowing a partial assignee
to recover in equity is simple and convincing: "The objection that the debtor
would be inconvenienced by partial assignments, while apparent if he could
be pursued by each assignee separately upon his portion of the claim, is
entirely wanting where the parties may all be brought before the court in one
proceeding and their rights all settled in one decree." Ry. v. Volkert, supra.
p. 370. The only authority contra is in Missouri. where the court proceeds on
the theory that the debtor's consent is essential, otherwise no limit could be
put to the extending of the rights of partial assignees. Burnett v. Crandall.
63 Mo. 410 (x876).
The mass of authoritv, therefore, seems in accord with
the decision in Forster v. Baker, supra.
Statutes similar in scope and effect to the English Judicature Act, sup.
have been passed in many of our states. Among others are Maine R. S. c
82. See. 130. which gives the assignee a right of action in his own name. provided he files a copy of the assignment. 91 Me. 338: Colorado, Laws of '97.p.
o8. Sec. 16; Iowa Code. 1897, Sec. 3459. see Roberts v. Corbin, 26 Iowa. p. 325;
New York, Wait's Code, See. Itl p. Ili. and Parson's i9o9 Code. Sec. 44o
(amendment 1877) : New Jersey. i8go. P. I. p. 24. All of these statutes give
the assignee of a chose in action the rizht to s e at law in his name. In none
of them are the rights of a partial assignee recouznized or even mentioned.
No case has been found in any jurisdiction recognizing the rights of a partial
assignee to sue in his own name at law. In at least one cae the attempt was
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made to enforce such a right under one of the statutes mentioned and distinctly deftied by the court. Otis v. Adams, supra (N. J.). Under the
authorities noted, therefore, it does not seem to be assuming too much to say
that it is general law in both England and this country that the partial assignee
of a chose in action cannot sue in his own right.
Co.rucr OF LAws-MARRIAG.-Appellant and decedent, residents of
Minneapolis, had been married in Germany, and, in settling decedent's estate,
the validity of the marriage was questioned. Held, that its validity should be
determined by the German code. In re Landis' Est. 127 N. W. j125 (Minn.
1910).
The general rule is that the validity of a marriage is to be determined.
by the law of the place where the cerempny is performed. A marriage legal
where solemnized is valid everywhere. Stull's Est. 183 Pa. 625 (1898); Clark
v. Clark, 52 N. J. Eq. 65o (1894). But there are numerous exceptions, which
can be divided into two classes: (x) Marriages deemed contrary to the law of
nature, and these are either incestuous or polygamous; (2) Marriages which
legislatures have declared invalid because contrary to the policy of the laws,'"
morals or municipal institutions. Comm. v.. Lane, 113 Mass. 458 (1873).
Marriages in the direct lineal line of consanguinity, and those contracted
between brother and sister are generally held to be incestuous. Suttoli v.
Warren, 51 Mass. 451 (1845). - And, consequently, the intermarriage of a man
with his mother's sister is included under the general rule. Sutton v. Warren,
supra; contra, State v. Brown, 47 Ohio, 102 (i8go); U. S. v. Rodgers, 109
Fed. 886 (i9ol ; and likewise marriages between first cousins. Comm. v.
Isaacman, x6 D. R. 18 (igo6) ; Garcia v. Garcia, j4 N. W. 586 (S. D. igio) ;
contra, Johnson v. Johnson, io6 Pac. 5oo (Wash. 19io). But as in each of the
above cases the marriage was unlawful in the state of domicile, it was immaterial which law applied.
The general rule does not prevail over a statute prohibiting the marriage
of the guilty person in a divorce for adultery, with the adulterer or adulteress.
Stull's Est., supra; Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 4 (1889) ; or over one prohibiting the guilty party from marrying at all. WVilliams v. Oates, 5 Iredell,
(1908); contra, Van
1845): Lanhan
136 Wi.
360 supra.
535
(N. v.C Brintuall,
(i88t) ; Coin.
v. Lane,
86 N. V.v.i8 Lanham,
V'oorhis
Whether it overrides a statute prohibiting intermarriage between negroes
and white persons seems to depend upon the policy of the. particular state.
In Louisiana such a marriage was declared void, the court remarking: "We
prefer to pass the details of this record in silence." Dupre v. Bonlard's Ex.
to La. Ann. 411 (1855); contra, State v. Ross, 76 N. C. a42 (1877); Medway
v. Needham, x6 Mass. 157 (1819). But a marriage entered into with a person
non conipos mentis is governed by the lex loci. True v. Ranney, 21 N. H.
52

(185o).

In England the courts have construed statutes prohibiting certain kinds
of marriages, as imposing a personal incapacity upon all coming within their
provisions, and have held such marriages to be void, regardless of the law
of the place where they were solemnized. Sussex Peerage Case. ii Clark &
F. 8i (1844) ; Brook v. Brook, 9 H. L. Cases. i94 (i86).
DAMAGES-PROI'ERTY RIGHT IN CORi'S.-In Miner v. Canadian Pacific
Rwy. Co., 15 L. R. West Can. 161, Aug. 8, 191o, the plaintiff, the mother
and executrix of the deceased, shipped his body by defendant's railway. The
body was put off the train at the wrong station and did not arrive at its
proper destination until a day later, thus occasioning expense by postponement of the funeral, etc., held: that the doctrine accepted in English law
that there can be no property in a corpse does not rest upon a sound
foundation and is not sustainable as a general proposition. The law
recognizes property in a corpse but property subject to a trust. The courts
will give appropriate remedies against interference with the right of custody,
possession and control of a corpse awaiting burial, presupposing a right
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of -property therein subject to the obligations of proper care and decent
burial. The decision contains an interesting summary of the English law on
the subject.
The theory that there is no property in a corpse is due largely to the
ecclesiastical authority over burial in England. One of the earliest references
to it is in Coke's Institutes, Vol. III 2o3. "The burial of the cadaver, that is
caro data vernubus, ismfllius in bonis." See also Blackstone Bk. II, 429.
The most important decision in the United States ig the report of the
referee in the widening of Beekman St., 4 Bradl. 5o3 (1857) where the
English law is' carefully considered and thought inapplicable to our conditions. Much of the apparent difficulty of this subject arises from a false
and useless assumption, in holding that nothing is property that has. not a
pecuniary value. The real question.is not of the disposable, marketable value
of a corpse, or its remains,- as an article of traffic but it is of the sacred
and inherent right to its custody in order decently to bury it and secure its
indisturbed repose.
Following this idea,'the courts have generally held that there is a right
in a corpse but it is not a definite property right. "While it may be true
still that a dead body is not property in the common commercial sense of
that term, yet those who are entitled to the possession and custody of it for
purposes of decent burial have certain legal rights to it which the law
recognizes and will protect." Larson v. Phase, ioMinn., 307 (i8qi). Neighbors
v. Neighbors, 23 Ky. L. R. 1433 (i9o). But see Griffith v. R. R., 23 S. S.
25, (1884) where in an action by an administrator for injury to the body of
his intestate, it was held that the right to recbvery was analogous to real
estate; if any existed, it passed to his heirs.
It is well settled that for an injury to the body after burial, the owner
of the lot may bring trespass 9. e.f. Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mss. 281
(1868). It has been held that although there was no property right in a
corpse, a relative though not the owner of the soil was authorized in invoking protection against a desecration of a place of burial. Page v. Lymonds,
But see Guthrie v. Weaver, i Mo. App. 136- (1876);
63 N. H. 17 (883).
Wynkoop v. WAynkoop, 42 Pa. 239 (1893). The right ceases with burial.
Where a dispute arises between relatives as tp the body, it is generally
held that there is no property right and the case is usually setiled according
to the justice of the situation. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313 (19o4) ;
Weld v. Walker, 330 Mass. 422 (i881); Hadsell v. Hadsell, 7 Ohio Circ. x96
(1893). Replevin will not lie for a corpse. Guthrie v. Weaver, supra;
Keys v. Konkel, si9 Mich. 550 (1899).
Several cases in which the principles involved have been the same as
in our principal case have arisen in this country and recovery has been
allowed. "The courts which declare the right to recover for mental anguish
in a case of this character do so upon the assumption that a human corpse
is property; not property in the general acceptation of that term but a quasi
property-that is it so resembles property in the right of relatives to control
and direct its interment and to have it kept inviolate from negligence or malicious injury that the law of the rights of property and the remedy for the
destruction thereof should be extended to such cases, measuring the injury and
compensation by the mental suffering of the living occasioned by the destruction of the dead." Long v. Chicago, etc., Rwy. Co., 15 Okl. 512 (19o5).
Accord: Beam v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Rwy., 97 Ill. App. 24, (igot);
Kyles v. Southern Rwy., 147 N. C. 394 (igo8); Lindle v. Gt. North. Rwy.,
99 Minn. 4o8 (ixo6); Wright v. Hollywood Cemetery, 112 Ga. 884 (19oo);
Bumey v. Hospital, i69 Mass. 571 (1897).
For an interesting discussion of the general subject see ig Am. Law Rev.
251. For an exhaustive collection of authorities see 18 Abb. New. Cas. 76.
DEmT-REscrssjox oF CONTRACT FOR MISREPRESENTATIOINS-MADE
THROUGH MERCANTILE AGExcy.-The appellant in Davis v. Louisville Trust
Co., x81 Fed. 1o (19IO) purchased fifty shares of stock in the defendant
corporation relying on a report furnished by its president to a mercantile
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agency. The statements contained in the report in regard to the capital
stock and business of the corporation were materially false and the purchaser
sought to rescind the contract. Held: The report must be considered as
addressed to-any person to whom it should be furnished by .the mercantile
agency, in the regular course of business, or to whom it might rightfully be
communicated either as a basis for credit or for investment in the stock
of the corporation and that statements therein constituting false and fraudulent
representations, entitled the purchaser to rescind the contract.
In Eaton, Cole & Burnham Co. v. Avery, 83 N. Y. 34 (i8go) it wasdecided that where a member of a firm makes to a mercantile agency statements known to him to be false, as to capital invested in the firm's business,
with the intent that the statements shall be communicated to persons interested in ascertaining the pecuniary responsibility of the firm, designing thus
to procure credit, and defraud such persons, and. such statements are
communicated to one who in reliance thereon sells goods to. the firm upon
credit, an action of deceit is maintainable against the partner making such
false representations. This rule as more broadly stated, i. e.. a false statement to mercantile agencies as to one's financial condition is fraudulent
as to persons who deal with him in reliance on such representations, has
been generally followed. Genessee Saving Bank v. Barge Co., 52 Mich. 164
(1883) ; Fechheimer v. Baum, 37 Fed. z67 (1888) ; Stover & Abbott Mfg. Co.
v. Coe. 49 I1. App. 426 (1893); Bliss v. Sickles, 142 N. Y. 647 (1894);
Triplett v. Rugby Distilling Co., 66 Ark. 219 (1899); Cox Shoe Co. v. Adams,
z65 Ia. 402 (i&)g) ; Salisbury v. Barton, 63 Kan. 552 (19o); In re Weil, III
Fed. 897 (igoi); Courtenay v. Knable. & Co. M'f'g Co., 97 Md. 499 (1903).
The facts of these decisions concern sales to the person making the- report
to the agency and upon which reliance was placed by the vendors but in
National Bank of Merrill v. Ill. & Wisconsin Lumber Co., 101 Wis. 247
(1898) the principle was extcnded to when a bank loaned money to a
corporation in part on the faith of statements made by the latter to comcondition.
mercial
But agencies
in the as to its offinancial
the co'rt
in the principal case, "it is not difficult to
conceive that it language
would be to the interest
of business concerns
to employ
to attract deale rs in investments and investors
"
commercial agencies
themselves." Such seemed to be the situation in this case, and moreover by
the evidence of the general custom of commercial agencies such statements
are given to these agencies for the purpose of giving them-to "inquirers:'
Of this class the plaintiff was one and the case is in line with the leading
cases on the subject. Scott v. Dixon, 29 L. J. (Ex.) 62 and Peek v. Gurney,
L. R., 6 App. 377.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-UNLAWFUL SALES BY SERVANT OF DEFENDANT.In the trial of a druggist for unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors, evidence
of an illegal sale made in the absence of the defendant by his clerk was
sufficient to support a conviction. Walters v. State, 92 N. E. 537 (Ind. 19io).
On its facts this case is in acc6rd with the great weight of authority, construing statutes regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors. It is generally
held, that the State makes out a prima facie case by evidence of an unlawful sale made b- a servant of the defendant. Comm. v. Briant, 142
Mass. 436 (1886); Rooney v. Augusta, 117 Ga. 709 (x9o3); Anderson v.
State, 22 Ohio 305 (1872). Contra. requiring Orosecution to show affirmatively
that the principal knew and consented to his ageit's acts, Sweeney v. State, 9i
S. W. 575 (Tex. i9o6).
The cases are irreconcilable on the point involved in this case. namely,
whether the proprietor is criminally liable for all unlawful sales made by
his servant, although expressly forbidden. Some cases hold that the -intent
of the Legislature is to require the principal at his peril to see that no
unlawful sales are made in his establishment. He can escape liability only
by emploving trustworthy servants. Carrol v. State, 63 Md. 551 (1885);
494. Other cases require that the acquiescence
Noecher v. People. 91 Ill.
of the proprietor be established at least circumstantially. The owner was
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absolutely liable for selling to minors in State v. Kittelle, no N. C. s6o
(j892); contra, Comm.v. Stevens, 153 Mass. 421 (189i) ; for sales to habitual
drunkards, Comm. v. Uhrlig, x38 Mass. 492 (z885) ; contra, People v. Parks, 49
Mich. 333 (1882); and for sales by druggists' clerks, People v. Longwell,.i2o
Mich. 310 (x899); contra, U. S. v. White, 42 Fed. 138 {x89o) [syllabus
misleading).
.The different wording of the statutes construed by the courts of the
various states does not account-for the difference in results appearing in the
cases. Compare Ind. Acts, 1895, p. 248, c. z27, § 912, applied in principal case;
Pa. Act of May i3,1887, P. L. io8, § 16, applied in Comm..v. Johnston, 2 Pa.
Super. Ct. 317 (1896); and Mo. Laws, 1883, p. go, §2, as applied in State v.
McGrath, 73 Mo. 181 (880).
LANDLORD AND TEXA.T-DIsTRESs-THIRD PERsoxS PLEA OF EXEMPTroNS LAws.-A husband executed a lease in writing for a house and lot,

waiving the benefit of all exemption laws. The landlord issued a distress
warrant for rent in arrear on which goods -of" the tenant's wife were
distrained. It was held, in a suit by the wife against the landlord, that
she was not entitled to the benefit of the exemption for debtors under the
Act of April 9, 1849, P. L. 533. Swaney v. Doumont, 4 Pa. -Super. Ct.
49 (91o).

The Act of i849, supra, enacted that "property to the value of three
hundred dollars, exclusive of all wearing apparel of the defendant and his
family * * * and no more, owned by, or in the possession of any debtor,
shall be exempt from levy'and sale on execution, or by distress for rent."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has decided that under this statute
a subtenant or assignee of a tenant, who has not been recognized as such
by the landlord, cannot claim the benefit of the exemption law as against
a distress for rent. Rosenherger Y. Hallowell, "35 Pa. 369 (i86o). The
decision in that case went on the ground that neither -the relation of landlord and tenant, nor that of debtor and creditor exists between the landlord
and such assignee. Exactly the same reasoning was applied as between the
tenant's wife and the landlord in Swaney v. Doumont, .sulra. It follows that
the wife's goods are in no better position than those of a stranger which are
found upon the premises, and have been declared subject to distress 'both
at common law and under the Pennsylvania Act of 'March 1, 1772. Kessler v.

McConachy, i Rawle 435 (1829).
The wife would seem, however, not to be without a remedy. The
eleventh section of the Act of i85o gives a married woman the right to
have a trustee appointed to recover and take care of her -separate property.
And a tenant on whose premises a stranger's property is seized for rent, is
liable over to the stranger. O'Donel v. Seybert, 13 S.& R- (Pa.) 54 (1825)."
There is no reason, therefore, why a wife, by her trustee, should not, in an
action against her husband, be able to recover for property seized on a
distress warrant for rent against her husband.
The- principal case overrules earlier adjudications at common pleas,
Balmer v. Peiffer, i6 Lanc. L. R. 25i (1899).
LANDLORD AND TENANT-CLAIM FOR RENT IN B.NKRt'PTCY.--I re Roth

& Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (igio) the Court held that a covenant to pay rent
creates no debt until the time stipulated for the payment arrives, and therefore rent accruing under a lease after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
against the lessee is not provable against his estate hs "a fixed liability * * *
absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition within the meaning
of Bankruptcy Act July I, 1898."
All decisions, with the exception of a few in Pennsylvania. seem to agree
that rent to accrue in the future is not a provable debt. In re Mfahler, 105
Fed. 428 (19o); Bray v. Cobb. ioo Fed. 27o (i9oo) ; Atkins Y. Wilcox, io5
Fed. 595 (19oo) ; hi re Ells.. 98 Fed. 967 (190) ; In re Hays, 117 Fed. 879
(xo) ; Lamson Consol. Store Service Co. v. Bowland, 114 Fed. 639 (19o2);
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In re Mitchell, 1i6 Fed. 87 (1902); Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359 (zo5);
In rc Rubel, 166 Fed. 131 (i90); Loveland Bankruptcy, 3rd Ed. 365, Collier
Bankruptcy, 7th Ed. 72o.

These authorities are not in accord on the method of reasoning by
which the conclusion is reached. Some hold that an adjudication destroys
the relation of landlord and tenant and practically annuls the lease. In re
Jefferson, .tspra; In re Hays, stpra; Bray v. Cobb, supra, based on decisions
of Bailey v. Loeb, 2 Fed. Cas. 376 (1875) ; In -re Webb, 29 Fed. Cas. 494;
In re Breck, 4 Fed. Cas. 43 (1875).
Others hold that the debt not being provable in bankruptcy, as before
the day at which the rent is covenanted to be paid, it is. in no sense a debt, it is
not affected by the discharge. The bankrupt remains bound by his covenant
but the trustee is not and may adopt the lease within a reasonable time or
ignore it entirely, but it is not terminated by an adjudication. This view,
founded on the decision in ex parte Houghton, Fed. Cas. 6,725 (1871), seems to
be supported by the weight of authority. ]n re Mitchell, supra; Vatson v.
Merrill, supra; In re Ells., supra; In re Mahler, supra. In Atkins v. Wilcox,
supra, the rent covenanted to be paid at times subsequent to the filing of the
petition did not, constitute a provable claim but the court avoided deciding
the question of the termination of the lease.
•
In Pennsylvania a landlord is entitled out of the proceeds of personal
property upon the demised primises in the hands of a receiver or trustee in
bankruptcy, under the Bankruptcy Law of March 2, 1867, to priority of payment of rent due at the time of filing the petition, not exceeding one year
as upon an execution. Platt, ct al. v. Johnson, etal., i68 Pa. 47 (18-9);
Tenfal v. Rowan, 179 Pa. 408 (1897). The same principle has been followed
under the Bankrupt Act of July 1, j898. ]I re Gerson & Dist. Rep; 277
(1899). It is immaterial that only a small amount had accrued before' the
bankruptcy where the lease for years contains an agreement by the lessee that
if he should become bankrupt during the term the whole rent for the unexpired term should at once become due and collectible. The claim, however, was only allowed for one year. In rc Goldstein v. Am. Banker, Rep.
603 (i899). This departure in Pennsylvania from the generally accepted law
can be traced directly to the interpretation of Act' of June i6th, 1836.
Purdons Dig. Ed. 1873, 879; in Longstreth v. Pennock, 87 U. S. 575 (1874).
LARCNY-TORTIOUS TAKING AND SUBSEQUENT FELoxious Co.vFRSlON.-

In Wilson v. State, 131 S. W. 336 (Ark. 1go), on an indictment for larceny
it appeared that the prisoner took a bull out of a range thinking it his own,
and kept it for some time in his own pasture. Subsequently he discovered
the mistake but converted the bull with felonious intent. The court held
this could not constitute larceny because the felonious intent did not exist
at the time of the taking. This conclusion was arrived at through the drawing of a distinction that appears unsound. The court mentioned the well
known rule that where the taking is tortious, as every act under it is a
trespass a subsequent conversion animus furandi is larceny, but refused to
bring this case within the rule. McCullock, C. J.: "Conceding that this is the
correct rule it cannot be extended so as to apply to one who took property
in good faith under an honest belief of ownership, for in this there is no
element of willful trespass even though there be a subsequent conversion with
knowledge of the true ownership."
Assuming that by "willful trespass" is meant "willfully wrongful trespass" it may be said that there is no sound ground for such a limitation
to the rule in question. Trover, like trespass, is a possessory action, and
moral delict is not necessary to give rise to a right to bring it. The taking
of the bull was beyond question tortious and when the felonious conversion
followed the crime of larceny was ccmplete. Clark and Marshall, Law of
Crimes, §320; Bishop's New Criminal Law, 8th Ed. II, §839; Regina and
Riley, 6 Cox, C. C. 88.
The cases cited to sustain the decision in the principal case do not seem
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to support it. With one exception they arc cases of subsequent felonious
conversion of property by a hinder. In "the one case in point the court wholly
overlooked the rule discussed.
MASTER

AND

SERVANT--SAFE

PLACE To W-VoREK-IXsPECTION

'BY

STATE

LiCENSE Exi'sar.--Under an Illinois statute requiring ihe'employment of a
legally qualified mine examiner to inspect the mine each day before the
men were permitted to enter and to see that all dangef'ous places are properly
marked, a mine owner cannot avoid a liability which would otherwise be
his because the mine examiner inspected a dangerous place the morning
of the occurrence and in good faith believed it was safe. Aetitus v. Spring
Valley Coal Co., 92 N. E.I._79 (Il1. 191o).
The mere fact that statutes require certain employees to be licensed
thereby limiting the employer's field of selection, does not prevent- such em-.
ployee from being a servant for whose negligence -the master is liable.
lartin v. Temperley, 4 Q. B. 298 (1843). But these statutes go 'further.
The duties imposed at common law on the employer to provide i safe place to
work are entrusted to "this state certified servant. Yet it has been very
generally held the master may not escape liability on proof that the injury
resulted from the negligence of a servant, who was entrusted with the
duty of providing a safe working place.. Colorado Coal Co. v. Lamb, 6 Col.
App. 255 (1895); Hough v. Railway Co.. oo U. S. 213 (1879); Coal Co.
v. Young, 117 Ind. 52o (1888). Some. states; however, have held 'that the
master is relieved on the ground that the mine boss is a creature of the
legislature, selected by the mine-owner in- obedience to the commands of the
law and in the interest and protection of the mines themselves; that as such
he is a fellow servant of the injured employee. Colo. Coal' Co. v. Lamb, Sitpra;
Williams v. Thacker Coal Co.. 44 W. Va. 599 (1898); Del. & Hudson Canal
Co. v. Carroll, 89 Pa. 374 (1879); Redstone Coke Co. v. Roby, IiS Pa. 364
(z886). And see Durkin v. Kingston Coal Co.. 1i Pa. 193 (1895) where that
part of an act making the owner liable for the negligence of such foremen
was declared unconstitutional.
It is submitted that the gist of the action is not the failure to employ
a competent mine boss, but grows out of the failure of the employer to
discharge the duties resting on him in relation to providing a safe working
place for his servants. Employing a foreman prescribed by statute should
not be enough to relieve him from such liability. Sommer v. Carbon Hill Coal
Co., 32 C. C. A. t56 (898); Schmalstieg v. l.eavenworth Coal Co., 65 Kan.
753 (x9o); Antioch Coal CO. v. Rockey. 82 N. E. 76 (Ind., 19o7); Smith
v. Dayton Coal Co., 115 Tenn. 543 (19o5). But see Sale Creek Coal Co. v.
Priddy, 96 S. W. -6io (Tenn. 19o6) where the statute confers on fhe certified
foreman control of the mine, independent of the mine-owner.
The principal case is in line with the earlier Illinois decision, Catlett v.
Youug. 143 Ill. 74 (892): Odin Coal Co. v. Dennon, i85 Ill. 413 (19oo);
Merteus v. Southern Coal Co., 235 I1. 54o (I9o8) ; in holding' that good faith
does not excuse. and that the question of whether the place was dangerous
is for the jury. This rule makes operators absolute insurers of the safety
of their mines; and yet it would seem that the operator fulfills his duty
to his employer, if lie commits this examination to careful and. skillft@l
bosses who conduct the same to the best of their skill and ability.
Vaddell
v. Simoson, 112 Pa. 567 (1886); Hughes v. Improvement Co., 20 Wash.
294

(188).

MASTER AXN SFRVA\T-As-i.%irTox OF Ris.-In Poi v. Nama Black
Coal Co.. 127 N. W. iio5 (Ia.) Oct. 26. 191o. the plaintiff was injured through
defendant's breach of a statutory duty in failing to provide proper covering
for the cages in the shafts. The defence of assumption of risk was interposed.
Weaver. J.: "Notwithstanding the absolute liberty with which every individual is legally endowed to enter into contract for his personal labor or
service and his equal legal right to abandon such service at any time subject
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only to liability for damages in case such act be not justified, it is nevertheless true in practical life that poverty, scarcity of employment, dependent
family and other circumstances often impose moral compulsion upon the
laborer to accept employment upon such terms and under such conditions
as are offered him, and it is in recognition of this fact, as well as the further
facts, that society has a direct interest in preserving the lives and promoting
the well being of all persons engaged in productive industry that laws have
been enacted to protect them against unnecessary hazard of injury by failure
of employers to exercise proper care for their safety. 'To say that the
legislature in enacting these nieasures of protection which in some degree
equalize the advantages of employer and employee and afford a needed protection to the persons and lives of the latter intended that a master might
violate the statute to the injury or death of his servant and then escape
liability by pleading and proving that his offence against the law was
habitual, obstinate and notorious is inconsistent with justice and it is hardly
extravagant to say Tepugnant to good morals. Such a rule offers a premium
to contemptuous disregard of the statute and robs it substantially of all
value to the class in whose interest it was enacted."
The two eases which have caused such an even split of authority
on this question are St. Louis Cordage Co. v. Miller, 126 Fed. *495, 1903,
18o9.
and 2Noramore v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Rwy. C., 96 Fed. '
The former proceeds on the theory that the statutory duty of protection
imposes no greater obligation than the common law duty and if the. servant is
willing and able to waive the latter, why should he not be allowed to waive
the former as well? The other viewpoint is that the duty is not an
individual one with the performance of which the servant may dispose if he
so desires but a social one, a breach of which is against the State itself.
In following one or the other of these decisions, the courts are very evenly
divided.
The majority of decisions seem to favor the Narramore case. Kirby v.
Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Assn.. 127 Mo. App. 588, 19o7. M. K. & T. Rwy.
v. Goss, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 30D, 1903. Camp v Chic. & Gt. West. R. R, z24
Ia. 238, 19O4. Swick v. Portland Cement Co., 147 Mich. 454, 1907. Moore v.
Centralia Coal Co., 140 II1. App. 291. i9o8. Valjajd v. Carnegie Steel Co,
226 Pa. 314, 1910. Johnson v. Far West Lumber Co., 47 Wash. 492. 1907.
Kansas M'f'g Co. v. Stark, 77 Kan. 648, 1908. Halley v. Tex. & P. R. Co.,.
113 La. 533, 1904. Paul M'i'g Co. v. Racine, Adin, 43 Ind. App. 695, i909.
Beiterly v. B. G. & A. R. R.. 159 Mich. 385, igog; Kilpatrick v. Grand Trunk
Rwy.. 74 Vt. 288, 19o2. Johnson v. Coal Co., 114 S. W. 722. Lind v. Uniform
Stave & Package Co., 12o N. AV. 839 (Wis.).
The following jurisdictions hold the contrary view supporting the St.
Louis Cordage Case. Linoleum v. Rice, 2o2 Mass. 82, igog. Cleveland. &
Fast R. R. v. Somers. 24 Ohio, C. C. 67, 1902. Kase v. Minn. St. P. & L. M.
Rwy., 1O7 Minn. 26o, go9. Walker v. Simmons M'If'g Co., 131 Wis. 547, 19D7.
Denver R. R. v. Lannon, 40 Colo. 195, 197. Mika v. Passaic Point Wks.,.
76 N. I. L. 561. 19o8. Since the passage of the Employers Liability Act
in New York (Laws. 19o2. Chap. 6oo No. 3), assumption of risk is made
a question for the jury, Kiernan v. Eidlitz, io9 App. Div. 726, 19o5.
In the Federal courts it would seem that assumption of risk is not
available as a defence in case of the infraction of a Federal statute. Bolan
Darnell Coal Co. v. Villiams, io4 S. W. 867, (Ind. Terr.). In actions based
on the violation of a State statute, the courts should follow the interpretation
given to the statute by the court of the state in which it was enacted.
Inland Steel Co. v. Kachwinski, 151 Fed. 219, 1907. Welsh v. Barber
Asphalt Paving Co., 167 Fed. 465 (19o9), but such has not always been the
policy. St. Louis Cordage Co. v. Miller, supra.
As a general rule, it would seem that the courts are now tending
toward the Narramore doctrine, largely on the ground indicated in that
decision and on that given in the principal case.
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MASTER AND

SERVANT-1VORKMEm'S

ComiPaSAIox Ac .- The Laws of

191o, ch. 674, of the State of New York, provide in substance that-If, in
the course of certain dangerous occupations, personal injury to a workman"
by accident arisifig out of and in the course of the employment is in whole
or part caused by (i) a necessary risk or danger of the employment, or one
inherent in the nature thereof, or (z) a failure of the employer or any of
his or its agents, officers or employces to exercise due care or comply with
any law affecting such employment, then such employer shall, subject to certain exceptions, be liable to pay compensation.
In Ives .. South Buffalo Ry Y. Co., 124 N. Y. S. 926 (igo), decided in
the Supreme Court of the State, the plaintiff brought himself squarely within
the provisions'of the act by alleging facts that established as admitted by the
answer, that while employed by the defendant, as a switchman, he- was
injured in the prosecution of his work, without negligence on the part of
the defendant and "without serious or wilful misconduct" on his part, but
solely by reason of a necessary risk or danger of his employment or one
inherent in the nature thereof. *The defendant maintained that the legislature
had exceeded its power in passing this act for the reasons that it deprives
the defendant of liberty and property without due process of law, and denies
it the equal protection of the laws in contravention-of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Article i, Paragraph 6 of
the Constitution of New York State. The court, in holding the act constitutional, observed, "The common law imposed upon the employee entire
responsibility for injuries arising out of the necessary risks and dangers
of the employment. The statute before us merely shifts such liability upon
the employer. That the legislature has the power to deal with the question
of employers' liability on a basis other than fault is not clear beyond peradventure, but every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of the
act, nor do I find its constitutionality so doubtful as to warrant this court.
in holding that such action is not within the constitutional powers of the
legislature."
This act is plainly based on the AVorkmen's Compensation Act of England
6 Edw. VII C. 58, and goes a step beyond any of the so-called "socialistic"
legislation in this country up to the present time. The employers' Liability
Act of i9o8 imposed no liability where there was no negligence on the part
of the company, its servants or agents. 'Statutes in the several States consistent with this act have been adopted, and generally speaking have: (i)
abolished the fellow-servant rule and assumption of risk doctrine in certain
employments; (2) instituted the comparative negligence rule, ahd (3) made
railroads absolutely liable for injuries to passengers who have not been guilty
of gross negligence. These acts have been held constitutional.
The New York statute, however, imposes a liability independent of the
master's negligence, and it is hardly probable that the question of its
constitutionality will be permitted to rest upon the decision of an intermediate
lower court of appeal. As to the expediency of such legislation, an address
by Mr. Floyd R. Mechem before the Illinois State Bar Association, 4 Ill.
L. R. 243. contains valuable suggestions. He points out that legislation affecting the relation of employer and employee must, in general, be State legislation. as Congress has no control over the matter, except in connection with
interstate commerce: that uniform State legislation is difficult to secure; that
much of the business to be affected is more than State wide in operation;
and that such legislation must be under State constitutions and the Fourteenth Amendment, demanding due process and equal protection of the laws.
Legislators in England and Germany do not meet with these difficulties.
Mr. Mechem also objects to a liability law. and advocates a union of employer
and employee in furnishing an adequate insurance in view of the exigencies
of the employment, and an entire elimination of the question of legal liability,
which he says is not likely to be settled to the satisfaction of either.
Interesting discussions along this line can be found in New York Bar
Association Reports. Jan.. 1910. Vol. 33, and the Journal of Political Economy,
June, 1910, p. 465.
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MASTER AND SERANT-FoR SERVANT'S WILFUL INJUaY To TRSPASSERS.-

The case of Penas v. Chicago, etc., Ry., 127 N. W. 926 (Minn.; xgo) deals.
with the liability of a Railroad -Company for the act" of its brakemen, in
ejecting a trespasser from a train, and thereby injuring him. The opinion by
Jaggard, J., is a voluminous but very instructive review of the liability of a
master to third persons for the tort of his servant. Both the English and
American doctrines are discussed, and their limitations based on tradition
rather than sound reasoning and logic, deprecated.
American judges have regarded the liability both from the view point of
the master and of the person injured; they 'have emphasized, not so much the
authority of the master as the duty imposed upon him to the person injured,
which has been violated by the servant. In many cases the master is held
liable, although the act is disapproved of or clearly forbidden by him. Singer
Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. S18 (1889); although the motive of the servant was
malicious or capricious. Dealy v. Coble, .in -App. Div. 296 (i9o6). The
growing tendency is to get away from the tests of "scope of authority,"
"implied authority," and "course of employment," which are often fallacious and fictitious, but accord with surviving ti'adition. Liability may attach
because the master has put in the servant's power an ability to do damage
by means of instrumentalities dangerous intrinsically or potentially. The
employer cannot escape liability because the wrong was beyond the scope
of the servant's authority. R. R. v. Scoville, 62 Fed. 73o (1894); R. R. v.
Shields, 47 Ohio 387 (i8oo). The liability is recognized in the master.largely
.because he has put it w'ithin the power of the servant -to inflict harm by
investing him with means or putting him in positions, innocent enough in
themselves. See Kline v. R. R., 37 Cal. 400 (1869), the facts of which are
similar to the principal case. While the language of authority is often
used to describe the liability of the master under these circumstances, it is
strained to meet the conclusion which the court has reached by independent
reasoning. Romell ,. R. R., 68 N. H. 358 (1895) ; and as in the leading case
of Rounds v. R. R., 64 N. Y. 129 (1876), where the court wrestles with the
doctrine of authority, but finally rests the master's liability upon the violation
by the servant of the master's negative duty to abstain from willful violence.
"The test of liability should be determined primairily by the reason the
law assigns, and not by incidental or collateral circumstances, to be consistent with tradition." In this case the test advanced was the violation by the
servant of the duty to abstain from willful harm owed by the defendant to
the plaintiff.
PRINCIPAL

AM)

SLRETY-GUARANTY-NOTICE

oF

AccF.TANCE-tVHEN

REQUIRED.-In a case recently decided in South Carolina one of the questions
raised was whether the defendant could be held on a guaranty that he
would see plaintiff paid for any goods supplied to a certain company, this
being written in answer to a request for such a guaranty, but plaintiff not
having notified defendant of his acceptance of same, though he did supply the
goods to the company. The court decided in favor of the plaihtiff. J. L
Mott Iron Works v. Clark, 69 S. E. 227 (S. C., x91o).
The basis of the decision was that when the guarantee requests the
guarantor to make guaranty, and the latter does so, "the minds of the parties
have met, and there is no reason for further notice." In other words, the
request for a guaranty is, in effect, to be twisted into an offer, and the
promise of the guarantor into an acceptance. This precise question has"
not been presented very often, though it is doubtful whether any real distinction should be drawn between such a case and one where the guaranty
was not made on request. However, such a position has been taken in two
cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States and cited in the
present case, though the statements in both are dicta. Davis v. Vells, 1o4
U. S. 159 (188i) ; Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Richards, 15 U. S. 524 (1885).
In Pennsylvania notice of acceptance is required whether the guaranty is in
answer to a previous request, or an offer itself, and the dicta of the two
U. S. cases above quoted are referred to as unconvincing as well as contra to
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the doctrine already established in tbis-State, Evans v. McCormick, 167 Pa.
247 (1895). It is submitted that the position of the Pennsylvania court is
more consistent than that taken in the present case, though it may be doubted
whether the doctrine requiring notice of acceptance is in any case well
founded. It is supported by the weight of authority, however, though the
jurisdictions base their conclusions on different grounds. For a good discussion of the whole question see 5 Columbia Law Rev. 215.
SALE OF GOODS By DsscluiIoN-Isrusn WARRATY- ENGLISH SALE OF

GOODS Ac.-The defendants, as wholesalers, sold to the plaintiffs, retailers,
certain seed described as "common English sainfoin" seed, but which was in
reality "giant sainfoin" seed, an inferior variety, under a contract whereby. the
sellers gave "no warranty, express or implied, as to growth, descripion, or
any other matters." The plaintiffs sought to recover. damages, they having
recompensed their sub venders for the failure of the crops. Held: The defendants were protected by the clause in the contract from any claim
for damages for breach o'f warranty. Wallis, Son & Wells Y. Pratt &
Haines. io3 Law Times xi8 (igio).
Where vendor sells goods by a particular description, -it is a condition
precedent to his right of action that the thing he offers to deliver, or
has delivered, should answer the description. Varley v. Whipp. f Q. B.
513 (igio); Columbian Iron Vorks v. Douglas, 84 Md. 44 (1896). When
the goods have been so dealt with as to make their return by the -vendee
impossible the condition ceases to be available as a condition and may be
converted into a Warranty, for breach of which recovery must be sought
in damages. Bentsen v. Taylor, Sons & Co., 2 Q. B. 274 (1893); Wolcott v.
Mount, 36 N. J. L ,62 (1873) ; Morse v. Union Stock Yards, 21 Or. 289
(x89x).
This doctrine has been incorporated in the English Sale of -Goods, Act
1893, § 11, 1. c. The Americani Uniform Sales Act, calls the condition that
the goods shall correspond to the description an implied warranty (§ 14).
Since, however, under this act, a breach of warranty justifies rejection of
the goods, or an action for damages if goods are retained (§ 69) this difference in Terminology makes no difference in the remedy.
Cases adjudging the doctrine .of implied warranty of identity are. uniformly those in which the failure of the article to answer the buyer's
demand is not evident on inspection. The following cases where the
vendee of an inferior variety of seed has been permitted to recover full
damages are typical. White v. Miller, 71 N. Y. x8 (1877); Shaw v. Smith.
45 Kas. 334 (i8qi); Edgar -. Breck & Sons. 172 Mass. 581 (1899); Hoffman
v. Dixon, ioS Wis. 315 (19oo) ; contra, Shisler v. Baxter, iog Pa. 443 (1885).
This last case may be distinguished on its facts, the buyer really got what
he bargained for.' There is a dictum in accord with the general authority
in Fogel v. Brubaker, z22 Pa. 7 (888).
TORT-LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE lSTITUTIox.-A workman. employed
thereon. was injured by reason of the defective condition of the premises of
the Salvation Army. The latter sought to escape liability on the -ground
that it was a charitable institution, and that for the negligence of its agents
and servants the rule of respondent superior did not apply. Held: The
plaintiff could recover. Holdein v. Salvation Army, 92 X. E. Rep. 626
(1910).
For the "Trust Fund Theory" of exemption of charitable institutions
from tort liability, see s8 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 428, April,
(1910).
W¥ILI.S-CEDIBLE AND DISINTERESTED
NIlA

VITNESSES UNDER THE PE..-SYLVA-

ACT o APRIL 26. i855.-In Jeanes' Estate. 228 Pa. 537 (191o). the next

of kin sought to defeat certain charitable bequests in the will of the testatrix
on the ground that one of the witnesses is not credible and disinterested
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under the Act of April 26, 1855, P. L 332. The will named the Pennsylvania
Company for Insurances on "Lives and Granting Annuities as executor
and also as trustee to hold certain shares of its own stock, in trust for
the charities in question. The witness in question was an officer and stockholder of the company. Held: He was not a party of such interest as to
be an invalid attesting witness under the act.
This decision does away with the uncertainty caused by the decision
in Kessler's Estate, 221 Pa. 314 "(igo8). In that case the subscribing witness,
in addition to being named as executor and trustee was an officer of the
church to which part of the income and ultimately a portion of the corpus
of the trust estate was directed to go. The witness was held interested and
the opinion severely criticised an earlier line of cases under The act, e. .g.,
Jordan's Estate,- j61 Pa. 343 (1894), which had held an executor credible
and disinterested, on the ground that that conclusion was reached on the
unsound theory that an executor's interest was uncertain, remote, and
contingent, and not such a certain and vested interest as intended by. the
act. The court in Kessler's Estatd pointed out that an executor's interest is
not more contingent than that of any legatee or devisee.
Jeanes' Estate, however, affirming Jordan's Estate, and applies its-reasoning to the services of a trustee as well as an executor, being careful to
point out, however, that the real basis of that reasofiing is not- the con-tingent *quality of the interest* but the fact that commissions paid to
executors and trustees are mere compensation for services rendered. This
limits the decision in Kcssler's Estate to the proportion that an administrative.
officer of the charity in question is an interested witness under the act.
It may be noted that the small proportion of the trustee's commission
which would fill to the witness did not rule Jeanes' Estate. The :court
said: "'The amount of his interest would be immaterial, for the doctrine,
de itnininis non curat lex has no application. The test is not quantity but,
quality."

